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Abstract
We propose a new methodology to estimate the share of household income accruing
to children (i.e., the cost of children). Following the principle of the Rothbarth
approach, the identi￿cation of the children￿ s share requires the observation of at least
one adult-speci￿c good. However, our method di⁄ers from this traditional approach
in that it allows measuring economies of scale in the household and indi⁄erence
scales in Lewbel (2003)￿ s sense. We illustrate the method with an application on
the French Household Budget Survey.
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11 Introduction
Evaluating what parents spend on children is an essential prerequisite for inferring in-
dividual living standards from income data. The Rothbarth method ￿one of the most
common methods of measuring the cost of children ￿consists in imputing the same level
of utility to parents that have the same level of consumption of some adult-speci￿c goods,
and deriving from this the fraction of household total expenditure devoted to children.1
The underlying intuition is that the welfare of parents is a monotonic increasing func-
tion of expenditures on adult goods. This method is simple and relatively sound because
founded on an individualistic representation of the household (Gronau, 1988). Nonethe-
less, a serious problem is concerned with economies of scale, due in particular to the
possibility of joint consumption in multi-person household. These scale economies may
a⁄ect the consumption of adults￿goods via a wealth e⁄ect as well as price e⁄ects and may
lead to biased estimations of the cost of children. In fact, as pointed out by Deaton and
Muellbauer (1986), the estimations obtained with the Rothbarth method are, in general,
abnormally small.
In the present paper, we suggest a variation of the Rothbarth method which is consistent
with economies of scale and with parental bargaining. Our approach is closely related
to the most recent developments of the literature on collective models.2 In particular,
Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2008) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) consider a
model where each individual is characterized by a speci￿c utility function and suggest
the complete identi￿cation of (a) the sharing rule of household resources and (b) the
1See Deaton, Ruiz-Castillo and Thomas (1989), Gronau (1991) and Lazear and Michael (1988) on the
Rothbarth approach. See Browning (1992) and Lewbel (1997) for a survey of the various techniques used
to measure the cost of children.
2In the traditional literature on collective models, children and their implications for the intra-
household allocation are generally ignored: empirical estimations are carried out using a sample of
childless couples (Chiappori and Browning, 1998; Donni, 2009). We are aware of only two studies on
collective models that explicitly deal with children: Bourguignon (1999) and Blundell, Chiappori and
Meghir (2005). See Chiappori and Donni (2010) for a survey.
2economies of scale, exploiting simultaneously data on couples and single-person house-
holds. Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2008) account for economies of scale using a
(price) transformation ￿ la Barten while Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) adopt an inde-
pendence of base technology of production, i.e., they suppose that there exists a single
function, which is independent of total expenditure, that scales the expenditure of each
individual in the household and represents the economies from joint consumption. While
these authors focus on childless couples, we extend the approach to families with children
and show how to retrieve the sharing rule between wife, husband and children as well as
the consumption technology. To represent economies of scale, we follow Lewbel and Pen-
dakur (2008) and make the independence of base assumption. This assumption allows us
to achieve identi￿cation without price variation, which makes the estimation much more
tractable and is also very convenient when using data in which spatial or time variation
in prices is limited. In line with the traditional Rothbarth method, we suppose that there
is at least one adult-speci￿c good which provides the necessary information to achieve
identi￿cation of the most important structural components of the model.
Our theoretical results are implemented using the 2000 French Household Budget Survey
(INSEE). We suppose that the household expenditures on certain pieces of clothing can
be seen as an adult good and we estimate a system of ten budget share equations in order
to measure the cost of children and the economies of scale. Our evaluation of the cost of
children turns around 22￿24% of the total expenditure of the household, which is much
more conform to intuition than traditional evaluations based on the Rothbarth method.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and demonstrate
how it can be identi￿ed. In Section 3, we present the functional form and the method of
estimation. We present the data and report the results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
32 The Model
2.1 Preferences, Technologies and the Decision Process
We consider three types of households, namely, a single individual (n = 1), a couple
without children (n = 2) and a couple with one child (n = 3). Individuals are indexed
by subscript j while superscript k = 1;:::;K denotes goods. By convention, we suppose
that j = 1 is a male adult, j = 2 is a female adult and j = 3 is a child. The log total
expenditure in a household is denoted by x and the vector of log prices by p. The indirect
utility function of a single individual j endowed with log resources x is supposed to be
well-behaved (monotonic, strictly quasi-convex, and twice-continuously di⁄erentiable) and








that is, if person j was living alone, and if he/she maximized his/her utility function
subject to a budget constraint, he/she would spend the fraction wk
j(p;x) of total expen-
diture exp(x) on good k. If he/she is living with other persons, his/her "basic" budget
share equations will change in a way that re￿ ects scale economies and resource sharing,
as further explained below.
In a multi-person household (n > 1), we ￿rst assume that total expenditure exp(x) is
divided between household members according to some rule. Precisely, individual j living
in household of type n receives a resource share ￿j;n(p;x) of total expenditure exp(x).
We do not specify the decision process, unitary or collective, that determines these shares
but suppose they may, in general, depend on prices and total expenditure.3 The shares
of all members are di⁄erentiable comprised between zero and one; they sum up to unity,
i.e.,
Pn
j=1 ￿j;n(p;x) = 1. To obtain our main results, we also adopt the same assumption
3For instance, we can imagine that the resources accruing to the child vary with the price of child
goods (such as child￿ s clothing or toys); see also Bargain and Donni (2008) on this point.
4as Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), that is:
A.1. The shares of expenditure do not depend on total household expenditure x, that
is, ￿j;n(x;p) = ￿j;n(p) for j = 1;2;3 and n = 2;3.
This assumption is potentially strong. It is likely however that identi￿cation can be
achieved without it ￿we keep this for future research. Moreover, this assumption can be
mitigated in empirical applications by including measures of household wealth other than
total expenditure in income shares. Our objective here is simply to keep the empirical
model simple and tractable at the expense of reasonable approximations.
Moreover, we assume that economies of scale and scope generated by joint consumption
of certain goods in the household can be represented by the independence of base (IB)
assumption. We introduce it formally below:
A.2. (I.B.) For each person j living in a household of type n > 1, we assume that there
exists a scalar-valued, di⁄erentiable function sj;n(p) such that the indi⁄erence curves of
individual j satisfy the condition:
uj = vj(p;x + log￿j;n(p) ￿ logsj;n(p)) (1)
for any level of log individual expenditure x + log￿j;n(p).
To unify our notation, we also set ￿j;1(p) = sj;1(p) = 1 for a single individual (n = 1).
Intuitively, equation (1) means that economies of scale can be summarized by a simple
income e⁄ect represented by the price-dependent de￿ ator sj;n(p). The latter measures the
cost savings experienced by person j resulting from scale economies in the household. The
IB assumption refers to the fact that scale economies are assumed to be independent of the
base expenditure (and hence utility) level at which they are evaluated. This assumption
is similar to the IB restriction in the equivalence scale literature, but it concerns indi-
vidual utility functions rather than aggregated household utility functions. Whereas the
5traditional equivalence scale literature restricts how indirect utility responds to changes in
demographic characteristics, equation (1) only restricts how an individual￿ s indirect utility
responds to the changes in the shadow prices of consumption resulting from economies of
scale.4 The fact that sj;n(p) depends on prices makes the IB scale far more general than
traditional Engel scales; in particular, the idea that some goods are consumed in common
(and thereby largely a⁄ected by economies of scale) while other goods are not can be
represented here by the derivative of sj;n(p) with respect to prices.5 The economies of
scale may also di⁄er between individuals within the same household, depending on how
they value the good which is jointly consumed. Note also that IB scales can be seen as
an approximation of Barten scales (used by Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel, 2008) in
the sense that demands can be both IB and Barten scaled if at least one linear restriction
exists on the log of Barten scales (Lewbel, 1991).
Denote logIj;n(p) = logsj;n(p)￿log￿j;n(p) so that equation (1) can be compactly written
as:
uj = vj(p;x ￿ logIj;n(p)): (2)
The term Ij;n is member j￿ s indi⁄erence scale as de￿ned by Lewbel (2003) and Browning,
Chiappori and Lewbel (2008). This concept di⁄ers from an ordinary equivalence scale,
which attempts to compare the welfare of an individual to that of a household, and
hence su⁄ers from the fundamental identi￿cation problem associated with interpersonal
comparisons (Pollak and Wales, 1979, 1992). In contrast, an indi⁄erence scale can be seen
as comparing the same individual in two di⁄erent situations: living alone and living with a
4The former is untestable while the latter can in principle be tested. See Lewbel (1989, 1991), Blundell
and Lewbel (1990), Blackorby and Donaldson (1990), Pendakur (1999).
5To take a loosy example, let us suppose that good k is associated with relatively important economies
of scale (like shelter). Hence, if the price of good k is very high so that the consumption of this good
is small, the total economies of scale, represented here by the de￿ ator sj;n(p) for member j, will remain
limited. However, if the price of good k decreases, enhancing the consumption of this good, then the
economies of scale will become more and more important, and sj;n(p) will decrease.
6partner (with or without children). It represents the income adjustment applied to person
j when living alone for her/him to reach the same indi⁄erence curve as when living in a
multi-person household, consuming a share ￿j;n of total resources and bene￿ting from scale
economies represented by sj;n. Implicitly, the direct utility or disutility from living with
others (such as love and companionship) is assumed to be separable from consumption
goods. Moreover, the couple￿ s economies of scale can be de￿ned as the scalar by which
the total expenditure of a couple should be multiplied for there exists a division of this
total expenditure such that the two persons obtain the same level of utility alone as when
in a couple. Denote sn(p) =
P
j=1;2 sj;n(p) the share of total expenditure devoted to
adults (which is equal to one in childless couples). The couple￿ s economies of scale can
be computed as the sum of the inverse of indi⁄erence scales,









Finally, note that with Assumption A.1, indi⁄erence scales as well as scale economies are
independent of the base ￿a property which is often imposed in the traditional equivalent
scales literature.
Denoting the log individual share as xj;n(p;x) = x+log￿j;n(p) and applying Roy￿ s identity







where the left-hand side of this expression is the fraction of member j￿ s share, exp(x) ￿














is the elasticity of sj;n(p) with respect to the k-th price. The consequence of the IB
assumption in the present context is that the budget share equations of person j when
7living in a household di⁄er from when alone only in that they are translated over log
household resources x by logIj;n(p) and over each wk
j (￿) by dk
j;n(p). This property is
referred to as shape invariance by Pendakur (1999). The translation function dk
j(p) is
speci￿c to good k and related to the di⁄erences that may exist between goods with
respect to the possibility of joint consumption.
We now suppose that data are observed in a unique price regime, as provided in cross-
sectional data, so that the vector of prices p is constant and can be taken out of equation
(3). Although scale economies do not depend on the base expenditure, they may vary
with the demographic structure of the household. Thus, a vector z of household socio-
demographic variables is introduced in equation (3). Formally, the implications of the IB
assumption in a framework with no price variation are described in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Assume A.1 and A.2. Then, the budget share of good k of person j living







j (x ￿ logIj;n(x;z);zj); (4)
where logIj;n(x;z) = logsj;n(z) ￿ log￿j;n(x;z) is the log de￿ ator of total expenditure
which combines the scaling e⁄ect sj;n and resource sharing ￿j;n.
Proof. Straightforward from equation (3). k
The left-hand side of equation (4) represents the ￿ reduced-form￿budget share of person
j on good k as a function of (log) household resources x and household characteristics
z. The right-hand side puts some structure on the budget share as a result of the IB
restriction. The individual budget share function wk
j (￿) depends on person j￿ s individ-
ual resources adjusted by the scaling factor sj;n(z) and on individual characteristics zj;
this share is then translated by the price elasticity of scale economies. The scaling e⁄ect
sj;n(z), and subsequently its price elasticity dk
j;n(z), generally depend on all the individual
characteristics of persons living in the household z. Indeed, in all generality, we cannot
8exclude that the extent of joint consumption be related to the characteristics of all the
persons living in the household. The resource share ￿j;n(z) depends on the vector of
household characteristics z and may also incorporate speci￿c variables that govern the
resource sharing rule (that is, distribution factors, according to the traditional terminol-
ogy of Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiappori, 2008).6 A possible candidate for these
variables candidate for these variables is the ratio of spouses￿exogenous incomes in as
much as the household bargaining power of spouses depends on what they earn.
For each good k, we can write total household expenditure as the sum of individual
expenditures on that good. Dividing this identity by total outlay exp(x), we obtain










n (￿) is the share spent by the type-n household on good k. This is simply the
sum of individual budget share equations over all household members, weighted by their












j (x ￿ logIj;n(z);zj)
￿
; (6)
where individual budget shares are translated both in budget shares and log-expenditure.
One word of reservation is needed here. Changes in the demographic structure of the
household may also generate modi￿cation of preferences and externalities in consumption
that are not explicitly accounted for by the IB assumption. Note that the model of
Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) exhibits basically the same problem even if it is perhaps
more critical as soon as children are incorporated in the analysis. In particular, the
apparition of a child in the household may generate important externalities. For example,
the parents may decide stop smoking and to change their leisure activities. Whether the
6Logically, the distribution factors do not enter scale economies because they in￿ uence behavior only
via the intra-household distribution of total expenditure
9de￿ ator sj;n(z) can conveniently represent modi￿cations of preferences and externalities
in consumption is a complicated question which is beyond the scope of the present paper.
If the answer is negative, however, the interpretation of the empirical results we make
may be biased. We have to keep in mind these potential limitations of the model.
2.2 Identi￿cation Strategy
Our goal here is to identify the important structural elements of the model, namely
resource shares ￿j;n(z) and scale economies sj;n(z), from demand data. To begin with,

















The classic interpretation of the stochastic term "k
n is that it represents optimization or
measurement errors. Alternatively, the stochastic component could be interpreted as re-
sulting from unobservable heterogeneity in tastes (entering utility functions), in economies
of scale and in the intra-household distribution of expenditure. For instance, if the elas-
ticities of scales with respect to prices are random, then "k
n =
Pn
j=1 ￿j;n(z) ￿ "k
j;n, where
"k
j;n is an idiosyncratic term for member j in the household. In that case, the term "k
n will
generally be heteroscedastic.
Identi￿cation exploits the following additional assumption:
A.3. There exists at least one adult-speci￿c good k (say), that is, a good which is
consumed by parents but not by children.
The concept of adult-speci￿c goods plays a major role in a well-known method used to
measure the cost of children and referred to as the Rothbarth method. Classic examples
of adult-speci￿c goods include certain pieces of clothing, tobacco and alcohol. The adult-
speci￿c good can be consumed by both parents, it has not to be speci￿c to the mother or
the father. The main result is then summarized in the following proposition.
10Proposition 2. Assume A.1, A.2 and A.3. Then, the resource shares ￿j;n(x;z) and
the scale economies sj;n(x;z), for j = 1;2;3, can be identi￿ed from the estimation of the
budget share equations W k
n(x;z) for the adult-speci￿c good k, with n = 1;2;3.
The proof follows in stage. We ￿rst discuss how to retrieve the "basic" budget share
equations. We then consider identi￿cation in the case of couples without child and in the
case of couples with one child. First, we have:
￿j;1(z;x) = 1; d
k
j;1(z) = 0; sj;1(z) = 1
for single men (j = 1) or single women (j = 2), so that single individuals are used as
the demographic structure of reference. The budget share equations of a single-person
household for all goods k = 1;:::K boil down to:
W
k
1 (x;z) = w
k
j (x;zj) + "
k
1: (8)
These equations can be identi￿ed from well-known results in non-parametric economet-
rics provided that the sample is su¢ ciently large and that the stochastic term satis￿es
some normalization restrictions. The additivity of the stochastic term on the right-hand-
side makes things simpler because, in that case, identifying the budget share function is
analogous to identifying its conditional expectation function.7
To retrieve the main structural components of the model, the basic idea is that di⁄erences
between an individual￿ s bundle of goods consumed as a single versus within a household
are assumed to be due to partially joint consumption, resource sharing and to changes in
total resources, but are not attributed to unobservable taste change. As argued by Gronau
(1988), this assumption, as strong as it may seem, is necessary to make the comparison
of individuals living in di⁄erent households possible.
We now consider the case of a childless couple, that is, n = 2. The household budget
7This assumption is not essential, though, as indicated by some results in non parametric econometrics
(provided that the stochastic term in each equation is unique (Matzkin, 2007)).

















The following lemma is, in fact, a reformulation of a result obtained by Lewbel and
Pendakur (2008).
Lemma 3. Assume A.1, A.2 and n = 2. Then, the functions sj;2(z), ￿j;2(z), with j =
1;2, are generically identi￿ed from the knowledge of the functions wk
j (￿;zj), with j = 1;2,
and the estimation of the budget share equation W k
2 (x;z) for good k.
Proof. To eliminate the constant dk
j;2(z) from equation (9), we compute the ￿rst order










x + log￿j;2(z) ￿ logsj;2(z);zj
￿
;
where the left-hand side of this expression is identi￿ed from traditional results in econo-
metrics. This equation generically de￿nes the functions ￿j;2(z) and sj;2(z), with j = 1;2.
To show this, let us consider a set of three observations f(xT;zT)jT = 1;2;3g such that
xT varies within its domain and zT is maintained constant and equal to some arbitrary
value ￿ z. Noting that ￿1;2(z)+￿2;2(z) = 1, there are three unknowns. For each observation,
there is one equation:
rxW
k
2 (xT; ￿ z) =
2 X
j=1




xT + log￿j;2(￿ z) ￿ logsj;2(￿ z); ￿ zj
￿
;
for T = 1;2;3. Then, counting equations and unknowns, we note that the system of
equations de￿nes the values ￿j;2(￿ z) and sj;2(￿ z) for any arbitrary value ￿ z. Once these












j (x ￿ Ij;2(z);zj);
12which identi￿es the left-hand side. Note that the functions dk
j;2(z) could be separately
identi￿ed if there were distribution factors that a⁄ect the distribution of resources without
a⁄ecting scale economies.k
This result is only generic in the sense that it is ￿ almost always￿satis￿ed in the traditional
mathematical sense. Still it is possible for arbitrary preferences that it is violated. For
instance, it is clear that the structural components are not identi￿able if the budget share
equation for good k is linear in its ￿rst argument. Formally, this result requires the
knowledge of the budget share equations, wk
1 (￿;zj), wk
2 (￿;zj) and W k
2 (x;z), for one good
only. Nonetheless, it is clear enough that further goods will improve identi￿cation and
generate over-identi￿cation restrictions.
In a further step, we consider the case of a couple with one child. The budget share

















Here, one problem is that the budget share equations of the child, wk
3 (￿); cannot be
directly obtained from a sample of single families as it was the case for mother and father￿ s
budget share equations. Moreover, it must be clear that the terms representing economies
of scale, dk
j;3(￿) and sj;3(￿), cannot be disentangled from the budget share equations, wk
3 (￿).
Potential scale economies for children are implicitly incorporated in preferences (just as
it is for adults in models where scale economies are not explicitly modeled). However,
these terms are actually meaningless concepts in a world where young children never live
alone. Hence, without loss of generality, we can normalize these terms:
d
k
j;3(z) = 0; sj;3(z) = 0:
To show how identi￿cation can be attained, let us suppose that good k is an adult-speci￿c

















13The following lemma then indicates what can be identi￿ed.
Lemma 4. Assume A.1, A.2, A.3 and n = 3. Then, the functions sj;3(z), ￿j;3(z), with j =
1;2, are generically identi￿ed from the knowledge of the functions wk
j (￿;zj), with j = 1;2,
and the estimation of the budget share equation W k
3 (x;z) for an adult-speci￿c good k.
Proof. The functions sj;3(z) and ￿j;3(z) can be identi￿ed according to the same method-
ology as previously. To sum up, the equation above is derived with respect to x to elimi-
nate dk
j;3(z) and then, the functions ￿j;3(z) and sj;3(z) for j = 1;2 can be identi￿ed, using
equation (10), from a set of 4 observations at least. Then, the resource share of the child
can be obtained as:




This lemma completes the proof of Proposition 1.
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Functional Form
For the estimation, we suggest a parameterization that balances ￿ exibility and empiri-
cal tractability. The ￿rst component, which appears in the speci￿cation of the di⁄erent
demographic groups, is the "basic" budget share equation. Following the recent recogni-
tion that a quadratic speci￿cation is generally necessary to model budget shares (Banks,

















for j = 1, 2, 3 and k = 1;:::;K, where ￿ is a given level of log scaled individual expen-
ditures (equal to x for a single n = 1 and to x ￿ logIj;n(z) for individual j in a family
n = 2, 3), ak
j, bk
j, ck
j are parameters, and ak
j and ej are vectors of parameters. The vectors
14of adult characteristics z1 and z2 include a dummy "age above 40", a dummy "tertiary
education", and dummies for "car ownership" and "urban resident". The parameters are
gender speci￿c (i.e., are indexed j = 1 for men and j = 2 for women) but do not depend
on the demographic type n since the "basic" budget share equations are the same for
single women (men) and for women (men) living in a couple. For children, the vector
z3 includes a dummy "female" in order to di⁄erentiate the cost of boys and girls and a
dummy "age below 2" to re￿ ect di⁄erences in children￿ s age.
We now turn to the speci￿cation of the household budget share equations. For single
male and female adults, they coincide with the "basic" budget share equations speci￿ed
above plus an additive stochastic term, that is,
W
k
1 (x;z) = w
k
j (x;zj) + "
k
1: (11)


















comprise the individual functions wk
j (￿;zj) as already speci￿ed and three other compo-











where ’j;n is a vector of parameters. The parameters of women j = 2 are set to zero for
normalization. To limit the number of parameters, vector z￿
j includes the sets of individual
characteristics zj for j = 1;:::n and a distribution factor ￿the wage ratio which is de￿ned
as the ratio of wife￿ s over husband￿ s earnings expressed in full-time equivalent ￿but it does
not include individual characteristics of the partner. Note also that, from the property
of the logistic function, the respective e⁄ect of children on the mother￿ s and the father￿ s
15share is proportionate. Secondly, the log scale function that translates expenditure within
the basic budget shares can be written as:
logsj;n(z) = ￿j;n + ￿jzj;
for j = 1;2, where ￿j;n and ￿j are parameters and vector of parameters. In principle, scale
economies can vary with all the variables used in preferences (i.e., zj for j = 1;:::;n)
but it is restricted to depend only on parameters of member j. To limit the number of
parameters, only the constant is indexed by the type of family. Finally, the scale function
that translates the basic budget shares dk
j;n(z) is a price elasticity. Measuring price e⁄ects
is generally challenging and it is all the more di¢ cult to capture their interaction with
demographics in any plausible way. Moreover, the translation terms are not robustly







The complete model is estimated by the iterated SURE method. To account for the
likely correlation between the error terms "k
n in each budget share function and the log
total expenditure, each budget share equation is augmented with the errors ^ ￿
1
n and ^ ￿
2
n
obtained from reduced-form estimations, speci￿c to family type n, of x and x2 respectively
on all exogenous variables used in the model plus some excluded instruments (Smith and
Blundell, 1986; Blundell and Robin, 1999, 2000; Banks, Blundell and Lewbel, 1997). For
the latter, we choose a fourth order polynomials in log household disposable income and
the inverse of the disposable income. Since budget shares sum up to one, equation for
good K is unnecessary. The household budget share equations for the K ￿ 1 goods and
for the three demographic groups are estimated simultaneously. The stochastic terms
are supposed to be uncorrelated across households but correlated across goods within
households. They are supposed to be homoscedastic for each family type n (and covariance
16matrices are supposed to be di⁄erent for single male and female). Observations in the data
are indexed by h and the number of singles, couples without children, and couples with
children in the data is denoted by H1, H2, and H3, respectively. Let Wn;h be the (K ￿ 1)
vector of observed budget shares for the ￿rst K￿1 goods consumed by household h of type
n and let ^ Wn;h(￿) be the corresponding (K ￿ 1) vector of predicted budget shares for a
parameter vector ￿. The vector of residuals is thus given by "n;h(￿) = Wn;h￿ ^ Wn;h(￿). If
^ "n;h = "n;h(^ ￿0), where ^ ￿0 is any initial consistent estimation of the vector of parameters,
the estimated covariance matrix can be de￿ned by
^ Vn = H
￿1
n ￿ (^ "n;h)(^ "n;h)
0 :









which gives a new value ^ ￿1 for the estimates. The estimation procedure is then iterated
with the new estimates until the covariance matrix converges.
4 Data and Empirical Results
4.1 Data and Sample Selection
Our sample is drawn from the 2000 French Household Budget Survey conducted by
INSEE. This data gathers information on household expenditures, incomes and socio-
demographics for 10;350 representative households. It was collected over the year 2000
and only little price variation is witnessed over this period so that the sample can be
treated as cross-sectional data. All household members who are at least 14 years of age
are interviewed. Durable goods are recorded for the past year, health and holidays ex-
penditures are for the past 6 months, clothing is for the past two months, consumption
of daily services and goods are recorded in diaries over the 14 days of the study.
17Our selection criterion is as follows. To begin with, we exclude households larger than the
nucleus family (parents, children), with more than one child or where the child is aged 14
or more (and hence not di⁄erentiable from adults in terms of clothing expenditure in the
data), which leaves out about 38% of the sample. We then select households where adults
are aged 18-59, which further restricts the initial sample by 26% and we withdraw another
2% corresponding to households where adults are students, in the army or retired (most
of this selection is already done through the age limits). Since leisure is not modeled here,
but is likely endogenous to consumption (and savings) decisions, we ￿nally restrict our
sample to working adults and full-time working men. This excludes another 13% of the
original sample, 7% of which is due to non-participating spouses in couples. The ￿nal
sample is composed of 2;155 observations and is described in Table 1.
In the estimation process, we consider a system of K = 10 non-durable commodities:
food (in and out), "vice" goods (alcohol, tobacco and gambling), male, female and child
clothing, transport, leisure, household operation, personal goods and services and housing
(the omitted good in the Engel curve system).8 In the original data, a marginal proportion
of single women reports nonzero expenditures on male clothing; the same occurs with
expenditures on female clothing by single men or expenditures on children by childless
households. These expenditures are interpreted as gifts and, in order to treat clothing as
an assignable good, they are not considered (indeed the motivation of gifts is completely
di⁄erent from that of direct consumption). Formally, one male-speci￿c good and one
female-speci￿c good is more than what we need to identify the main components of the
model. To improve estimations, however, we also suppose that expenditures on vice goods
are adult-speci￿c while expenditures on child clothing are child-speci￿c.
8Traditionally, expenditures on housing are not modeled (because these expenditures may be di¢ cult
to evaluate for owners). Nonetheless, we believe that expenditure on housing cannot be ignored when
economies of scale are considered. In doing so, we must mention that the size of the household may be
endogenous in making housing decisions.
18Figure 1: Descriptive Statistics
194.2 An Informal Look at the Data
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 provide a ￿rst overview of the problems we have
to address. For one time, let us adopt the traditional Rothbarth way of thinking. If
we consider adult goods, we note that the presence of one child reduces the household
budget shares devoted to parents￿clothing. More importantly, it can be shown that
expenditures in absolute terms also decrease. For instance, while the average yearly
expenditure on male (female) clothing is e613 (e766) in childless couples, it drops to
e570 (e647) in couples with one child. The Rothbarth intuition then suggests that, on
average, the parents·welfare from consumption (at least) declines when the size of the
household increases. This seems to be con￿rmed by the traditional Engel equivalence
scale approach: the budget share devoted to food ￿a necessary good ￿increases when the
number of persons living in the household increases, which conveys that the household
living standard is negatively related to its size.
Yet, the story is not complete. We observe that, in general, the budget share of all the
typically private goods (i.e., food, total clothing and, to some extent, personal goods
and services) increases with the size of the household while the budget share of typically
public goods (i.e., housing) decreases. The simplest interpretation is that economies of
scale are substantial, and that these economies of scale are not the same for all goods.9 In
particular, the decrease in the budget share devoted to housing when the household size
increases is consistent with a reduction of the household living standard only if housing
is a luxury good, which is certainly not the case. The other explanation is then that the
shadow price of housing is much lower in a large household than in a small household.
The ￿ quantity of housing￿consumed by household members is larger in larger families but
its budget share tends to be lower because of scale economies (and hence lower shadow
prices). Economies of scale generate a wealth e⁄ect that incites consumption of private
goods (provided that the distortion of prices due to economies of scale does not generate
9The e⁄ect of the household size for the other goods, that are partially private and public, is more
complicated to interpret and seems to be the result of opposite forces (and, possibly, externalities).
20a substitution away from these goods). This mechanism is similar to what is described
by Deaton and Paxson (1998).
A ￿rst rough estimate of expenditure shares can be obtained from the clothing shares. If
the spouses￿utility functions were identical and homothetic (so that the budget shares
of individual j would be independent of the level of total expenditure she or he made)
and if the economies of scale were independent of prices (so that the translation functions
dk
j;n(z) would be equal to zero), then the shares received by each individual would be







where good k represent clothing for individual j. For instance, the expenditure share of
fathers would be equal to 0:30 = 0:19=0:63, that of mothers to 0:35 = 0:22=0:63 and that
of children to 0:35 = 0:22=0:63 as well. The latter ￿gure seems to be larger than any
realistic measure of the cost of children. Such over-stating, however, may be explained,
among other reasons, by economies of scale in the household. Expenditure on children￿ s
clothing that are purely private cannot be compressed.
4.3 Estimations of the Complete Model
To begin with, we consider four variations of the model. In Model I, all the parameters
are free. This model is completely general. To improve the precision of the estimations, we
consider three variations which are more restrictive. In Model II, children￿ s parameters
c3 and e3 are set to zero. In addition in Model III, scales￿parameters ￿1 and ￿2 are set
to zero. In Model IV, the dummies "tertiary education" for both spouses are excluded
from the sharing rule.10 The most general speci￿cation has 238 parameters (out of which
10The number of optimal solutions of the iterated SURE optimization problem turns out to be large
(more than ten for the most general speci￿cation). To select the best solution, we used a maximum
likelihood criteria. It means that only the estimates for which the average determinant, weighted by the
number of observations, of the covariance matrix is the smallest are presented in what follows.
2188 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent form zero at the 10% level) while the most constrained one
has 220 parameters (out of which 92 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero). The Smith-
Blundell residuals prove to be (very) signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero; therefore, exogeneity
of total expenditure is clearly rejected by the data.
The estimated resource shares ￿j;n(z) for j = 1;2;3 evaluated for a representative house-
hold, as well as their standard errors, are reported in the upper panel of Table 2.11 For
childless couples, whatever the speci￿cation, the wife￿ s expenditure share is around 0:55
with a standard error of 0:07. By comparison, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2008)
report a female share in excess of 0:60 while Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) report a female
share between 0:36 and 0:46 with a standard error of 0:08: One simple interpretation, ne-
glecting the fact that standard deviations are large and resource shares not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from 0:50, is that women have the leading voice in the household. Note, how-
ever, that the household budget shares of goods can be seen as the weighted average of
the individual budget shares, with weight being equal to resource shares. In other words,
the result in the upper panel of Table 2 simply means that the household budget shares
are more similar to women￿ s budget shares than to hudband￿ s. Therefore, we cannot
exclude the fact that this similarity stems from self-selection at the time of the marriage
or changes in tastes after the marriage.
The share of children ￿interpreted as the cost of children ￿is around 0:23. Other studies
based on a more traditional Rothbarth approach obtain estimations of children cost which
are much lower. For instance, with United States data, Gronau (1991) estimates the cost
of one child at about 0:15 of total expenditure, with Spanish data, Deaton, Ruiz-Castillo
and Thomas (1989) at between 0:11 and 0:18 and, with Greek data, Tsakloglou (1991)
at between 0:09 and 0:13.12 The di⁄erences we obtain here compared to more traditional
studies is explained by economies of scale. Indeed, in the Rothbarth method, the cost of
11The representative household is composed of adults aged under 40, no tertiary education, living in a
urban area and owning a car. If they have a child, the latter is a boy above 2.
12Deaton and Muellbauer (1986) give measures of the same order using data of developing countries.
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23children is obtained as the residual of total expenditure after subtracting the expenditure
made for parents. The latter is identi￿ed from the comparison of the consumption of adult
goods in families with and without children. If the econometrician ignores economies of
scale, then she does not take into account their probable wealth e⁄ect and will likely infer
that adults in the household receive a larger share of total expenditure than what is really
the case.13
In the lower panel of Table 2, the estimated coe¢ cients of the expenditure shares are
reported (the wife￿ s share is the reference and the dummies "tertiary education" are
excluded in Model IV because they were not signi￿cant). Regarding the distribution of
resources between adults, the stable result is that living with older woman reduces men￿ s
share. It seems also that men￿ s share is also reduced for couples living in urban area, but
this result is not very signi￿cant. The distribution factor, i.e., the ratio of wife￿ s earnings
to husband￿ s earnings, does not signi￿cantly in￿ uence the intra-household distribution of
resources.14 Concerning the expenditure devoted to the child, it appears that boys are
favored. Needless to say, however, the larger proportion of total expenditure devoted to
boys (by comparison with girls) does not mean that the utility of the former is greater.
Without calling upon the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, boys and
girls do not necessarily bene￿t from the same joint production and are not characterized
by the same shadow prices. This result con￿rms the intuition of Lundberg and Rose
(2004), among others, that boy-girl discrimination may be revealed by the structure of
consumption. Even without clear-cut conclusions from reduced-form estimations, these
13In the same vein, estimations conducted under the assumption that there is no economies of scale,
that is, sj;n = dk
j;n = 0, give measures of the cost of children that are even lower than those of the authors
mentioned above. To make the fact that the budget share devoted to housing expenditure is smaller in
large households compatible with a model without economies of scale, the share of expenditure of the
parents must be very large, and that of children very small.
14Whether she works or not may be the margin that matters in this respect, more than di⁄erences in
productivities. As explained before, we focus here on two-earner couples and do not have variation in
female labor market participation (see Zamora, 2008).
24authors show that the gender of children is a signi￿cant variable to explain household
purchases.15
The individual economies of scale sj;n(zj) for j = 1;2 are exposed in the upper panel of
Table 3. To take an example, if men￿ s de￿ ator is of 0:75 for childless couples (say), the
cost of living for a man with a woman is 75% of the cost he would experience should he
live alone.16 Moreover, one would expect that scale economies increase (i.e., that de￿ ators
decrease) in families compared to childless couples. If these terms are to be interpreted as
re￿ ecting scale economies, de￿ ators sj;n should, in principle, lie between 0:50 (complete
jointness of consumption) and 1:00 (purely private consumption) for a childless couple
and between 0:33 and 1:00 for a couple with child. Taking into account these preliminary
considerations, we ￿nd that estimates of de￿ ators sj;2 for childless couples are reasonable
in magnitude, all located in the 0:5￿1:0 range, but very small. They amount to about 0:50
and 0:60 for men and for women, respectively. These results correspond to slightly smaller
de￿ ators, and hence larger scale economies, than those reported in Lewbel and Pendakur
(2008). The scales are imprecisely estimated but the results are not very sensitive to the
speci￿cation. Turning to estimates sj;3 for couples with one child, we ￿nd similar results,
with scale economies of about 0:40 for men and 0:45 for women. Our results show clearly
that, as expected, economies of scale increase with the size of the household.
Overall, economies of scale measured seem to be excessively large. On the basis of the
estimates of Model I, the couple￿ s economies of scale, En, amount to 1:73 with a stan-
dard deviation of 0:08. By comparison, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2008) obtain
economies of scale between 1:27 and 1:41. In all likelihood, our results are to be explained
15In our estimations, the e⁄ects of child￿ s sex on the child￿ s budget shares are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero. Overall, the parameters of the child￿ s budget share (not reported here) are not precisely
estimated (except for the e⁄ect of child￿ s age).
16As explained above, the de￿ ators sj;n could re￿ ect other aspects which are not explicitly accounted
for in the model, such as changes in preferences, externalities of consumption, domestic production or
changes in the nature (i.e., quality) of purchased goods when married compared to when single.
25Figure 3: Scale Economies
26by the inclusion of the budget share of housing among the budget shares we model, which
is not usual. Note that in a companion paper (Bargain and Donni, 2009), we use a similar
desaggregation and obtain a con￿rmation of the present measure of scale economies when
using data for another country (Ireland).17
The indi⁄erence scales, interpreted as the scale to household income that puts a single
individual on the same indi⁄erence curve as if living in couple, can easily be computed
by dividing scale economy de￿ ator by the expenditure share. At the sample mean, using
the estimates of Model I, the indi⁄erence scales, I1;2 and I2;2, of a woman and a man in a
childless couple are 1:10 and 1:21 with a standard deviation of 0:03 and 0:10, respectively
This implies that such a woman (man), if living alone, would need 0:90 ￿ 1=1:10 (0:83 ￿
1=1:21) of the couple￿ s income to reach the same indi⁄erence curve as when in couple. This
is clearly larger than a half because the single woman (man) would not bene￿t from scale
economies. In comparison, the indi⁄erence scales in a couple with a child, I1;3 and I2;3,
would be equal to 1:14 and 1:24 with a standard deviation of 0:03 and 0:10, respectively.
Interestingly, the indi⁄erence scales are estimated quite precisely in spite of the relatively
large standard deviations of scale economies and expenditure shares.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have suggested a new method to estimate the cost of children that
generalizes the more conventional Rothbarth method. This approach is consistent with the
existence of economies of scale and parental bargaining. Our empirical results on French
data indicate that child costs are much lower than what is obtained in traditional studies.
Deaton and Muellbauer (1986) point out that the measures from the Rothbarth method
17Nelson (1989) estimates the economies of scale associated to each good (including housing). She
obtains estimations that are very large and probably larger than ours. In particular, economies of scale
for housing seems superior to what would be in the case of pure joint consumption. She explains it by
increasing returns in household production
27are likely downward biased, but they did not propose an alternative strategy. Our method
provides estimations of the cost of children that amount to 23￿24% of total expenditure,
which seems more realistic The other important empirical contributions of this paper
are two-fold. Firstly, we show that, as far as expenditure on housing are considered,
economies of scale in the household may be very large. Secondly, the expenditure made
by parents for boys seems to be larger than for girls.
One ￿nal remark is in order. Even if, in our opinion, the estimations obtained here are
more realistic than what is generally reported, there are reasons to believe that these
estimations still understate the true values of the cost of children. Indeed, the time
devoted by parents to child care, which certainly represents a signi￿cant fraction of non-
market time, is not incorporated in our model. In particular, the mothers￿part-time
participation in the labor market that we observe in the data may well be associated
with the provision of child care. To account for child care, future work should certainly
incorporate labor supply decisions.
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